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ABSTRACT 
The success of open source applications such as Apache, Linux, and Sendmail spurred interest 
in this form of software, its development process, and its implication for the software industry.  
This interest is evident in the existing research being done to address various issues relevant to 
open source software and open source methodology.  This paper proposes a research 
classification framework that:   
•  informs about the current state of open source software research,  
•  provides a formal structure to classify this research, and  
• identifies future research opportunities. 
 
KEYWORDS: open source project, software engineering, software development, open source, 
economics of open source. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Open source software (OSS) allows users to access source code, to freely use the software as 
they see fit, to improve it, to fix the bugs, to augment its functionality, and to redistribute it. 
Distribution to other users is typically for free, or at a charge under an Open Source Initiative 
(OSI) approved license type .  These users can, in turn, modify and/or use the software according 
to their own needs. This approach is in contrast to proprietary and commercial software controlled 
by the owner (developer or corporation). Some popular examples of open source applications 
and their proprietary competitors are given in Table 1. The definitions of different OSS license 
types and the classification of select OSS licenses are given in Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Examples of Open Source and Proprietary Applications 
Application Proprietary Open Source 
Web Browser MS Internet Explorer, 
Netscape 
Mozilla (based on Netscape) 





JBoss, Apache Tomcat, Enhydra 
Office Suite MS Office, Corel 
WordPerfect Office 




MS Exchange, Lotus Notes Ximian Evolution 
Database Oracle9i, IBM DB2, MS SQL MySQL, PostgreSQL (both lack the power and 
depth of industrial-strength Oracle and DB2) 
 
The success of open source projects has led to an increasing interest in understanding this form 
of software and the way it is developed.  The nature of open source software, its concepts, 
benefits, and challenges are discussed in a recent CAIS tutorial [AlMarzouq et. al., 2005]. 
Readers new to the OSS area will find this article a useful starting point. Unfortunately, a 
comprehensive framework to classify existing OSS literature and research issues is lacking in 
studies on OSS. In particular, a classification framework should help position OSS-related 
research projects and assist in examining the progress achieved. Furthermore, classifying the 
existing literature will aid in information retrieval by providing a browsing structure for OSS sub-
domains. The analysis presented in this article will help fill these gaps and identify emerging 
research areas.  
II. A CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK 
Open source software research can be categorized into the following major phases:  
• Initiation Phase,  
• Ongoing Project Phase, and  
• Adoption / Deployment Phase.  
In addition, the literature examines coordination mechanisms, participation alternatives, and the 
impact of OSS related initiatives.  Figure 1 is an overview of the OSS phases used in our 
lassification framework.   c
 
INITIATION PHASE  
Research on the initiation phase addresses questions such as:  
• Why are open source projects started in the first place?   
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Figure 1. Open Source Software Phases  
Research issues include the identification, explanation, and verification of factors that influence 
the decision to initiate an open source project. These factors include: 
• personal/psychological (e.g., reputation enhancement among peers) incentives,  
• technical (e.g., need for certain functionality) incentives,  
• economic/strategic (e.g., competition, low development cost) rationale, and  
• social/political (e.g., desire to improve social welfare) reasons. 
ONGOING PROJECT PHASE 
 Research on the ongoing project phase addresses the continuity of open source projects. For 
example: 
What motivates • individuals and organizations to participate in an ongoing open 
source project?  
• pate? What are the roles they play and 
the quality of contributions they make?  
• rdinating and communication mechanisms aid or hinder open source 
projects? 
eater modularization, and dynamic decision 
aking structures [Robles 2004; Raymond 2001].   
How can individuals and organizations partici
Which coo
Currently, the roles and responsibilities of project participants are not clearly defined. In open 
source projects, the users are also co-developers.  Roles are also blurred by early releases, 
frequent code integration, increased versioning, gr
m
 
Coordination is crucial for the transformation of an initiative into an economically viable software 
application. The spontaneous, decentralized functioning of the open source community 
represents a challenge to many current notions of coordination. The open source philosophy 
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assures a “self-correcting spontaneous” organization of work that is “more elaborate and efficient 
than any amount of central planning could have achieved” [Raymond, 2001]. For example, it is 
possible to align the incentives of several different individuals without resorting to property rights 
and contracts. It is also possible to specify everyone’s tasks without resorting to a rigid and formal 
ierarchical organization.  
 
ADOPTION / DEPLOYMENT PHASE  
this phase 
considers the impact of open source on software quality, productivity, and evolution.    
ree phases of open source 
software and shows the various research issues in OSS (Figure 2).  
ion 
Figure 2. Research Classification Framework based on OSS Phases 
JECT INITIATION PHASE: MOTIVATIONS TO INITIATE AN OPEN SOURCE 
n 
open source software development project. These factors are grouped under the categories of:  
h
Studies in the adoption/deployment phase include the examination of strategic, economic, and/or 
social factors leading towards the diffusion of open source applications. In addition, 
Our proposed research classification framework is based on the th
The rest of our paper is organized as follows:  Section III classifies the research questions on 
motivations for starting an OSS project. Section IV examines the research on motivations of 
individuals and organizations to participate in ongoing OSS projects. Section V looks at the 
technology adoption and diffusion questions in OSS projects. Section VI presents the 
coordination mechanisms utilized in OSS projects. Section VII considers the various impacts of 
OSS, including project performance measurement and the impact on the software industrial 
organization. After identifying research gaps and extensions of the OSS research classificat












The existing literature identifies factors that motivate an individual or an organization to initiate a
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• unfulfilled demand,  
• strategic behavior,  
• development advantage, and 
• collective invention. 
es. Similarly, Linus Torvalds initially 
developed Linux as an inexpensive Unix-like operating system for his 80386-based computer 
source code was not available.   
 Open source projects are also initiated by businesses to: 
• gain first mover advantage among developers who participate in open source 
mium prices for their core product by 
 enterprise software with open 
The firs o
• attracting the best people to work on innovative projects  
• early development of an open source application, and  
dvantage and developing complementary software for its own 
eempt competition that relies solely on proprietary software. 
till encourage the diffusion of these applications among potential users. For example, 
hardware manufacturers may choose to open source unprofitable software accessories (such as 
UNFULFILLED DEMAND  
Many open source products are initiated to fulfill demand that cannot be met by proprietary 
software applications. Open source applications are used to fix problems encountered by IS 
professionals in their jobs. For example, the Apache webpage server was created because no 
commercially available software packages served web pag
because operating system 
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
• commoditize software that supports their core product, and  
projects.  
Organizations can increase demand and possibly charge pre
commoditizing the software. For example, IBM commoditized
source initiatives to complement its IT consulting business.  
t m ver advantage for open source projects comes from: 
• decreased likelihood of a customer switching. 
The combination of first mover a
core product and services can pr
DEVELOPMENT ADVANTAGE 
Individuals and organizations initiate open source projects because they believe they can lower 
the cost of developing, debugging, and enhancing a software application, and provide users with 
a better quality application. For many open source projects, a virtual community of developers 
grows around the software. The project initiator then incurs lower overhead because of unpaid, 
outsourced work and is closer to customers who actually use the products. Organizations that 
initiate an open source project (but do not become involved with the application development 
process) s
hardware drivers). Many Linux hardware drivers were developed independent of their hardware 
vendors.  
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Alternatively, organizations may choose the open source route because they believe it results in 
better quality software. Since many programmers are also users of the product, they have a 
vested interest in making the product the best it can be. These software developers, also referred 
to as use-developers, are capable of and interested in advancing the product. They contribute 
code, make comments, and participate in discussions.  Furthermore, there is the adage based on 
Linus’s Law of Software Engineering, i.e., “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” 
[Raymond 2001].  The more people look at a piece of code, the more likely one of them will find a 
r problem.  
ri, 2003]. Each rival uses the 
rece d
a pattern of collective inve
• A mechanism based on reputation, assuring the existence of mutual individual incentives 
• The disclosure of information should not prevent the owners of the technology or the 
innovation from reaping economic benefits from their innovations.  
ns. Thus, one can argue that OSS projects 
are started as collective invention, which results in applications that benefit not only the 
 
internal systems. Current literature takes the following approaches to address the motivational 
and/or an organization to join an ongoing open source project. 
bug before it becomes a majo
COLLECTIVE INVENTION  
Viewed historically, open source software is a type of innovation process called “collective 
innovation” [Allen, 1983]. In “collective innovation,” rivals freely release pertinent information 
about how they solved non-trivial technical problems [Nuvola
ive  information to improve the basic common technological layout. Allen [1983] argues that 
ntion requires three essential factors:  
• Users can choose between a leading edge but riskier design or an older but safer design.  
to disclose technical information to outsiders. 
All these conditions are met by OSS. For example, Linux users can either use even-numbered 
versions which are rigorously tested and stable, or use odd-numbered versions with more 
features, but not certified as fully stable. Every OSS project maintains documentation that 
illustrates the contribution from developers involved with the project. The initiators of OSS 
projects reap economic benefits from their innovatio
contributors but also the industry that adopts OSS.  
IV. OSS PROJECT ONGOING PHASE: MOTIVATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN OPEN 
SOURCE PROJECT 
Participating in an OSS project can manifest in several ways, including joining the project as a 
developer, providing financial support, promoting the project, and incorporating OSS platforms in
factors that influence an individual 
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The psychological approach is used to explain an individual’s motivation to join and is largely 
based on the assumption that developers are motivated by the recognition of their peers and not 
necessarily by profit-motives [Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2002]. Software programming is considered 
a creative problem-solving activity, especially among programmers [Raymond, 2001], who 
believe that “the value of a programming contribution can be “properly” appreciated only by other 
programming experts.” Open source projects provide programmers an opportunity to “display” 
their skills and to be acknowledged and appreciated by a large audience. For instance, Linux 
programmers have evolved to be highly disciplined, ethical and competitive, with a pecking order 
that excludes all but the best contributors [Koch, 2003]. This desire for peer recognition 
represents one of the most important individual incentives for joining open source projects 
[Raymond, 2001]. Such explanations can also find theoretical support in social psychology [Clary 
et al., 1998; Mauss, 1967] including social exchange theory [Blau, 1964], psychological contract 
theory [Rousseau, 1995], helping behavior and volunteerism [Benson et al., 1980; Clary and 
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Orenstein, 1991], and work design [Hackman and Oldham, 1980]. Both social exchange theory 
and psychological contracts theory are premised on the notion of an exchange relationship 
between two actors where the relationship is based on norms of reciprocity. Researchers should 
be cautious when applying these theories in the OSS context because empirical studies on open 
source software projects have found little evidence of reciprocity [Lakhami and von Hippel, 2003]. 
Another approach to explain the role played by peer-recognition in motivating individuals’ 
participation is from academic and scientific research. The reward system based on peer reviews 
in OSS is similar to the procedures that are typical of scientific research [Dasgupta and David, 
1994], where the production of technological knowledge appears to be governed by sets of “open 
., peer reviewed journals). 
e (e.g., Larry 
Wall does Perl consulting). Finally, many individual programmers participate in open source 
d “barn raising”, where neighbors get together to build a barn in expectation that the 
neighbor whose barn was raised will also help them when it’s their turn to build a barn [Green, 
]. Researchers also find support for career expectations and the 
creational value from software development as major motivators to participate in open source 
cts [Hann et al., 2004]. 
knowledge institutions” (e.g
ECONOMIC APPROACH 
Return on “Investment” for Individuals 
The craving for recognition among fellow programmers has led to one of the most common 
misconceptions about open source projects, which is that individuals contribute to OSS projects 
“only for peer-recognition, and they do not expect economic returns” for their efforts. Some open 
source project participants earn direct monetary benefits in exchange for their participation. For 
example, a survey of 141 Linux developers found that more than 43% received some form of 
income, while 20% receive a salary “for their Linux programming on a regular basis” [Hertel et al., 
2003]. Sometimes participants decide to contribute to an open source project in order to advertise 
a value-added service or a complementary, but proprietary, product that they produc
projects with the “expectations of future returns,” which can be classified as follows: 
Help with their own projects: The reasons behind this expectation are similar to those in an old-
fashione
2002].  
Signaling: The particular way in which open source projects are managed, and especially how 
contributions are attributed to individual developers, allows the best programmers to create a 
signal. For example, a public changelog file exists with the Linux project that lists programmers 
who have contributed to the official source and their specific inputs [Moon and Sproull, 2000; 
Raymond, 2001]. This is an honor and a sign of expertise among programmers [Lee et al., 2003]. 
By distinguishing themselves apart, individual developers can turn this signal into monetary 
rewards [Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Mustonen, 2002]. However, signaling for career 
enhancement [Hann et al., 2004] as an incentive to participate in an open source project is not 
well supported by empirical evidence. For example, intrinsic motivators (e.g., creativity, skills 
improvement, having fun) were found to be more important than extrinsic benefits (e.g., better 
jobs, career advancement) for volunteer private software developers [Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; 




Return on “Investment” For Organizations 
Unlike individual programmers, organizations choose to participate in open source software 
development projects based largely on economic reasons. In many cases these organizations 
sell complementary applications for open source platforms and earn significant profits from these 
transactions [Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lerner and Tirole, 2001]. For example, IBM promotes Linux 
because, among other things, it develops and sells proprietary applications for Linux 
[Economides and Katsamakas, 2004]. Other organizations sell accessories and complementary 
products such as t-shirts, books and computers with open source applications preinstalled 
[Varner, 1999]. Some organizations recover their cost of investment in open source initiatives by 
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using the project to advertise their core products and services. For example, Digital Creations use 
their “ZOPE” (Z Object Publisher Environment) to advertise web site creation services and 
Netscape used the “Mozilla” browser to advertise their web servers and web portals. Other 
companies give away their software for free, but sell customer support, documentation and other 
complimentary services [Varner, 1999]. In traditional proprietary software, a major percentage of 
the revenue is from software sales, and a smaller percentage is from support. An open source 
model dramatically shifts this to 0% sales and 100% support. With this approach, the free 
software is supposed to attract more users, and therefore more support revenues. Capturing 
even a small fraction of these users for complimentary OSS services would provide significant 
s selling such services.   
gon dynamics, i.e., the addition of one agent to 
the community of programmers immediately increases the probability of other non-members 
joining, sustaining the project over a long period. 
                                                     
financial gains to organization
“Public Goods” Approach 
Some researchers classify OSS as a public good supplied by voluntary private contributions 
[Bitzer and Schröder, 2002] since it is non-excludable and nearly non-rival. Furthermore, OSS 
provides benefit to society by increasing competition within the software industry. However, 
participants in open source projects apparently do not receive enough benefits to encourage 
everyone who is skilled enough to participate in the project. If this scenario is modeled as a 
game, then a self-interested individual would consider providing such software only if the benefits 
gained justified the cost of programming. Nevertheless, each developer/user is tempted to free 
ride and waits for others to develop the software instead. Therefore, one of the Nash equilibria for 
the game is for all players to be free riders, i.e., not participate in an open source project, with the 
result that no open source software is developed. However, many successful open source 
projects not only retain many of the initial developers but also attract new developers. Existing 
literature offers some explanations for this apparent contradictory behavior. Metaphorically, each 
programmer contributes a brick and each gets back a complete house in return. However, in 
software, unlike with physical goods, one person’s gain does not come at the expense of another, 
because a copy does not deplete the original in any way. Sharing software is not a zero-sum 
game, and there are tremendous efficiencies from participating in such a cooperative endeavor 
[Prasad, 2001]. Furthermore, if the open source software project is modeled as a war of attrition 
with complete information, job signaling, repeated contribution to the public good, uncertainty in 
programming, and no delay, then the software will be provided swiftly, by young, low-cost 
individuals who gain considerably by signaling their programming skills [Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; 
Hendricks et al., 1988; Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996]. This resulting equilibrium suggests that the 
startup of an open source project displays bandwa
V. OSS PROJECT ADOPTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
Linux and other open source systems face the challenge of getting adopted in an environment 
dominated by proprietary standards. Recent developments in the theory of critical mass in 
diffusion of technologies with network externality may help to explain this phenomenon 
[Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2002]. Another theory that takes a psychological/sociological perspective 
and may shed light on open source software diffusion is the diffusion of innovation theory 
[Rogers, 1995]1. According to this theory, “technological innovation is communicated through 
particular channels, over time, among the members of a social system.” It has been applied to 
information technology innovations, artifacts, techniques, and has been used as a theoretical 
basis for IS research projects. The application of this theory in the context of open source 
software is currently not clear. When applied to network technologies, a large part of the diffusion 
1 Please see Roger Clarke’s excellent primer at 
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/InnDiff.html  
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theory forecasts the emergence of a dominant standard and, as a second instance, the 
coexistence of different standards only if the diffusion dynamic of competing technologies begin 
at the same time. Open source software, however, spreads across systems even though there 
ems, their findings may also apply 
e need to add factors such as the 
role of project moderators, the notion of community goods, peer recognition, and other social 
frameworks that are important for OSS project participation.   
nd communication in OSS highlight the 
following approaches:  (a) conventions, (b) economics, (c) the shared knowledge about the 
software code, and (d) network governance principles.  
are pre-existing dominant standards and products (e.g., Apache vs. Microsoft IIS).  
Adoption of open source applications by organizations can also be explained by existing theories 
on software adoption such as the Technology Acceptance Model [Davis, 1989] and its numerous 
extensions.  Some of the factors found to influence adoption include perceived usefulness, ease 
of use, job relevance, output quality, results demonstrability, image enhancement, prior 
experience and subjective norms [Hartwick and Barki, 1994; Karahanna et al., 1999; Venkatesh 
and Davis, 2000; Moore and Benbasat, 1991; Adams et al., 1992].  Although most IT adoption 
studies have been conducted with commercial proprietary syst
to open source projects since the findings do not suggest that the system’s development 
methodology has an impact on the acceptance of the system.  
Technology adoption and diffusion studies have been conducted in contexts similar to open 
source software, but they often lack characteristics found in the open source movement.  For 
example, Chau and Tam [1997] studied the adoption of open-systems as an internal IS 
innovation and found only weak order effects on end-users and/or the underlying business 
process. The significant determinants towards open-systems adoption included: perceived 
barriers, satisfaction with existing systems and compliance with standards and interoperability 
[Chau and Tam, 1997].  Some researchers found that in software process innovations (such as 
object-orientated programming languages), there were greater propensities towards assimilation 
when there were more activities to spread learning-related costs, extensive knowledge related to 
the innovation, and a greater diversity of technical knowledge and activities [Fichman and 
Kemerer, 1997]. Nelson and Shaw [2003], in their study of adoption of interorganizational system 
(IOS) standards, found that the firm's installed base, top management support, feasibility, direct 
network effects, mission and conduciveness towards interoperability were significant 
determinants of IOS standards diffusion.  Collectively, these results (and others similar to them) 
provide a rich framework to understand OSS adoption, but w
VI. COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN AN OSS PROJECT 
An important area of research in the management of OSS projects is coordination. Understanding 
coordination in software projects, as in other complex tasks, has long been difficult. Several 
factors, including the scale of the project, uncertainty of outcome, and interdependence among 
project activities, make coordination of software projects challenging [Kraut and Streeter, 1995]. 
As a project size increases, keeping track of who knows what and successfully bringing that 
expertise to bear on a given project is difficult [Faraj and Sproull, 2000]. The organizational 
challenges faced by OSS projects are significant because the project must deal not only with 
problems faced by any software development process, but also with the complexity of 
coordinating efforts of a geographically distributed base of volunteers working on the software. 
The hierarchically organized and top-down planned structure of most proprietary software 
projects is replaced in OSS by a new kind of bottom-up, non-coercive and largely decentralized 
structure, even if shared behavioral rules are present. Distributed work slows development, 
impedes changes to the software, and leads to less communication between project participants 
[Herbsleb and Mockus, 2003]. Since most OSS communication is electronic, coordination could 
also suffer from the lack of spontaneous conversation and the inability to share complex and 
ambiguous messages [Yamauchi et al., 2000]. Despite these inherent weaknesses in OSS 
project management, we still see evidence of hierarchical coordination emerging without the 
support of property-rights based organization [Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2002]. In the rest of this 
section we show how the literature on coordination a
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CONVENTION AS A BASIS FOR COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION  
Conventions play a major role in the way open source projects are coordinated, and issues such 
as acknowledging contributions, preventing forking, fixing software shortcomings, and adding new 
enhancements are managed. Contributions of individuals in an open source project can be 
gauged from records maintained by OSS project initiator(s), also referred to as “project 
moderators”. The developer who contributes more, according to the records, is given more 
respect and weight in future decisions about the project [Cavalier, 1998]. This also minimizes the 
risk of “forking” [Kaisla, 2001], which happens when someone takes the open source code for a 
specific application and develops it to start a different “evolutionary” direction. In practice, 
however, such forking is rare and is always accompanied by re-labeling and public justification. 
The open source movement has an elaborate, largely spontaneous set of ownership conventions, 
which regulate who can modify the software, the circumstances under which it can be modified, 
and who has the right to redistribute the modified versions [Raymond, 2001]. Such conventions 
do not allow distributing changes to a project without the cooperation of the moderators and also 
prevent removal of a developer’s name from a project history, credits or maintainer list without the 
developer’s explicit permission. 
ECONOMICS AS A BASIS FOR COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
According to The Open Group [2003], there is also an economic reason that prevents forking.  
Large hardware vendors (i.e., OEMs) make it clear that they do not want to go through the UNIX 
system wars again. Open source software projects heed these warnings because the adoption of 
an open source application depends on more software vendors producing products compatible 
with the OSS application. When an OSS application has multiple versions/flavors, software 
vendors are forced to choose the versions to support and incorporate into their products, leading 
to an adverse impact on the adoption of the OSS application.  
SHARED KNOWLEDGE AS A BASIS FOR COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
The organizational theory of professions and the classic theory of clubs suggest two reasons why 
a community of open source participants is at least as good as a firm. First, the constituents of 
OSS projects have symmetry of absorptive capacity, i.e., the participants have similar technical 
skills and understanding of the project objectives. Second, the software itself is a capital structure 
embodying all knowledge and information necessary to take the project further [Garzarelli, 2002]. 
Because all developers have access to the relevant objective knowledge inherent in the source 
code, they need very little communication. Even this little communication takes place mostly 
when they are lobbying for their enhancements to be incorporated in the next version. The 
inherent knowledge in the software makes the communication process simple and relatively less 
costly. In addition, social contracts prevent conflicting interests from destroying the cooperative 
mode of interaction in OSS projects [Kaisla, 2001]. 
NETWORK GOVERNANCE AS A BASIS FOR COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
More recently network governance has been used to explain the coordination among open 
source contributors [Sagers, 2004]. Network governance is “characterized by informal social 
systems rather than bureaucratic structures and formal contractual relationships found in 
traditional firms” [Jones et al., 1997]. The restrictive access to the development team improves 
coordination within the project and safeguards exchanges among OSS project members [Sagers, 
2004]. Further, collective sanctions safeguard exchanges among project members, and the 
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VII. IMPACT OF OSS PROJECTS 
Two dominant areas in OSS impact literature are the measurements of project performance and 
the impact of OSS on the software industry.  Success or failure of proprietary software 
applications is generally measured by their market performance (e.g., installed base, market 
share). These measures, however, cannot be directly applied to OSS projects because of the 
difficulty in tracking and estimating the installation base or market share of OSS. Currently, there 
are more than 100,000 OSS projects [www.SourceForge.net] underway, and most are small 
projects with less than 50 developers involved in each.  Although some researchers have focused 
on analyzing measures of success in open source software projects [Crowston et al. 2003], there 
is little published research that investigates the determinants of the success in an open source 
project. Stewart and Ammeter [2002] identify some software-specific characteristics such as 
development status of the application. However, they do not include critical factors such as 
software license information in their analysis. Consideration of such license data will likely 
complicate the model due to the potential for endogenous license choice in project success. This 
issue has been highlighted in another study that explores the determinants of open source project 
success as measured by project popularity [Sen, 2005]. A study by Sagers [2004] defines project 
success in terms of the quality of coordination among project members, assuming that better 
coordination would allow the project to be more successful.  
Research on the impact of OSS on the software industry can benefit from two referent disciplines: 
industrial organization (IO) and economics of software development. The existing IO literature in 
information systems has largely focused on the importance of complementary components in the 
successful adoption of software, with emphasis on the implications of compatibility and the 
incentives of rival firms to make compatible components [Shy, 2001]. These studies generally 
conclude that compatibility is the unique equilibrium under most demand conditions. Farrell and 
Katz [2000] show that the integration of a monopolist into a competitive complementary market 
may weaken the innovation incentives of independent firms. Complementary components are 
typically assumed to be symmetric in systems literature. Some studies have also focused on the 
role played by positive network externalities in defining the industrial organization of software 
and/or hardware industry. For instance, early work in industrial organization studied the effects of 
network externalities on de facto standardization [Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 
1992; 1986; 1985].  Some of these studies focused on the role of technology sponsorship in 
creating a strategic advantage when incompatible technologies compete in markets with network 
externalities [Katz and Shapiro, 1985]. Another key finding is that the strength of consumer 
preferences for software variety drives the equilibrium outcomes for hardware platforms. When 
consumers place a high value on software variety relative to the difference in value of different 
hardware technologies, the equilibrium outcome is a de facto standardization in the hardware 
market (resulting in the only surviving hardware that is supported by software providers) [Church 
and Gandal, 1992]. 
Most of these studies have been conducted in the context of commercial software applications. 
Mustonen [2003] conducted one of the few studies specifically addressing open source related 
issues.  In this study, in which the participation in open source projects is endogenous, it is shown 
that low implementation cost of an open source application is crucial for its survival when it 
competes with a proprietary application.  In other studies, Casadesus and Ghemawat [2003] 
examined the competition between Windows and Linux.  Economides and Katsamakas [2004] 
compare software industry structures based on proprietary platforms with those based on open 
source platforms and identified the demand conditions that support various equilibrium outcomes. 
One of their results relevant to OSS research is that “social welfare in the software industry may 
be higher when the platform is open source rather than proprietary and the cost of adoption of 
open source platform is small.”  Another important result from the study is that the “proprietary 
software industry is more profitable than the open source software industry, if the users have 
strong preference for application variety.” These results, however, do not take into account the 
coexistence of both the open source and proprietary platforms. An extension of this model 
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proposed by the same authors addresses this limitation and concludes that “when systems based 
on an open source platform with an independent proprietary application compete with systems 
based on proprietary platforms and independent proprietary application, the open source system 
is typically dominant in terms of market share.” Sen [2005] proposes a more general model for 
competition between “free” open source software, commercial open source software, and 
commercial proprietary software. He identifies the conditions under which freely available open 
source software and/or the commercial version of the same will adversely affect the market 
position of proprietary software, and suggests some strategic steps that commercial software 
vendors can take in order to compete successfully.  
VIII. CONCLUSION: FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Despite all of the active OSS related research, major gaps remain that must be filled to enhance 
our understanding of this new form of software. This section summarizes our recommendations in 
order to provide directions for future OSS related research. Figure 3 summarizes the various 




• Classical Org Behavior







• Cross Sectional Understanding












• OSS Context Specific Determinants
• Distinguish Adoption vs Deployment
• Replication & Longitudinal Studies












Figure 3. Future Research in Open Source Software 
 
INITIATION PHASE 
Researchers have addressed issues relating to individual and organizational motivation for 
initiating open source projects, mostly using qualitative case studies (e.g., studies on Linux and 
Apache) and/or purely analytical approaches. Empirical validation of the results in a more general 
setting that involves several open source projects can improve our understanding of OSS. There 
is also a need to develop measurement instruments for personal/psychological, technical, 
economic/strategic, and social/political factors that motivate individuals and organizations to 
initiate open source projects. We can borrow instruments from referent areas, such as Davis' 14-
question instrument for perceived usefulness and ease of use [Davis, 1989] or the extensions in 
Venkatesh and Davis [2000].  Moore and Benbasat [1991] developed a general purpose 
instrument that examines eight areas in an end user's perceptions of an innovation.  Modifications 
are still necessary, however, to make these instruments suitable in an OSS context and to 
validate them.  Comparison of the underlying capabilities and limitations of different open source 
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based solutions are also important. Task-technology fit literature can provide insights into OSS 
adoption determinants, performance gaps, and coordination mechanisms [Goodhue and 
Thompson, 1995; Goodhue, 1995]. 
ONGOING PROJECTS 
The ongoing OSS projects phase literature is dominated by qualitative and analytical approaches. 
There is a need for empirical studies and instruments to measure the motivational factors and to 
understand the relationships among these factors. Empirical investigations into the success and 
failure of OSS projects can also contribute in a great way. Presently, we have anecdotal evidence 
of success or failure for a few large open source projects.  We lack a general framework that can 
be applied to the performance of open source projects of any size.  Another rich area concerns 
the impact of OSS on the management of in-house systems development efforts and off-the-shelf 
applications. 
ADOPTION / DEPLOYMENT 
Existing technology diffusion literature provides an excellent starting point for investigating factors 
that lead to the adoption and deployment of open source software.  Currently, there is a need for 
introducing and testing OSS specific contextual factors such as the role of project moderators, the 
notion of community goods, peer recognition, and other social framework issues. There is also a 
need for replication and longitudinal studies that validate the application of diffusion theories.  
Existing technology diffusion theories rarely examine the role of development methodology on 
diffusion.  It would be interesting to investigate if the inclusion of the development methodology as 
a factor sheds different light on the adoption or deployment decisions. Researchers should also 
clearly distinguish between studies on intentions to adopt, adoption, and deployment of OSS.    
 COORDINATION 
A significant opportunity exists for studying the evolution of coordination mechanisms in open 
source projects and the role played by open public networks (like the Internet) and online project 
coordination tools (e.g., Sourceforge.net). There is also a need to investigate the extent to which 
open source coordination mechanisms can be explained using classical theories from 
organizational structure, and whether the two different forms of organizations can learn about 
coordination and control from each other. With the emergence of organizations such as 
RosettaNet and the Open Geospatial Consortium, there may be a third form that provides a 
middle ground between the two extremes. These non-profit and predominantly vertically oriented 
standards development consortia (VSC) pool development resources among user groups and 
offer more formal coordination mechanisms and networks. Participation in these VSC is 
voluntary, decision making is consensus driven, and most are platform independent, vendor 
neutral and non-profit organizations [Nelson and Shaw, 2003].   Vertical standards consortia 
structures may provide a near-perfect coordination model for future OSS projects by offering 
flexibility, independence, speed and a semi-formal coordination mechanism.  
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES 
A rich source of research opportunities in OSS relates to the impact and consequences of 
innovation diffusion [Rogers, 1995].  The consequences can be measured in all OSS phases 
including initiation (product pricing, substitute products), ongoing projects (development effort, 
through-put), adoption (expectations, costs) and deployment (productivity, network externalities).  
Another impact area for future research is the examination of the impact of open source 
applications on the traditional commercial software industry. This could be addressed analytically 
using theories from industrial organization, or empirically by collecting industry level data on the 
performance of commercial software producers before and after the emergence of competition 
from open source applications. Firm level case studies could also be used to understand the 
strategies employed by commercial software manufacturers to combat the growing OSS threat.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Existing OSS research has been dominated by software-specific case studies, such as on Linux 
and Apache. Results obtained from these studies are difficult to generalize because these 
projects could be outliers. Most open source projects have a relatively small number of 
participants, focus on specific functionality, and have few organizational participants. Similarly, 
software industrial studies are dominated by mathematical modeling, which tends to simplify the 
economic interactions between participating players (open source developers, commercial 
software producers, open source support service provides, open source sponsors and others). 
There is a need for more empirical research methods, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, in 
this area. One reason for the slow pace of empirical research is due to the large, informally 
structured, and geographically dispersed nature of the OSS movement.. It is difficult to collect 
relevant cross-sectional and/or panel data. SourceForge.net, a website that maintains information 
on thousands of open source projects, is a possible source for such information.  Other data 
sources for particular open source projects could include email archives of source code change 
history and problem reports which are used to quantify aspects of developer participation, core 
team size, code ownership, productivity, defect density, and problem resolution intervals. 
Concurrent Version Control Archive (CVS) maintained by various open source projects can also 
provide a wealth of information on the projects.  
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Appendix A 
Strong Copyleft Licenses provide that once a program is licensed by a developer, the 
subsequent programs based on the original must also be licensed similarly [e.g. GPL]. Thus, 
for software with a Strong Copyleft license, the freedom to re-distribute the software is low. 
Weak Copyleft Licenses provide that once a program is licensed by a developer, the 
subsequent programs based on the original must also be licensed similarly, however they 
can be released under a different license under certain conditions [e.g. LGPL]. Thus, under 
Weak Copyleft license, the end-user has moderate freedom to re-distribute the software.  
Non-copyleft licenses: Developers are not obligated to inherit the original license [e.g. 
BSD].  This type of license provides the maximum freedom to the users to redistribute the 
open source software. 
 







GNU General Public License X   
GNU Lesser General Public License  X  
License of Guile  X  
License of the run-time units of the GNU Ada 
compiler 
 X  
X11 License 
(MIT License) 
  X 
Expat License   X 
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Standard ML of New Jersey Copyright License   X 
Public Domain   X 
Cryptix General License   X 
Modified BSD license   X 
University of Illinois/NCSA Open Source License   X 
License of ZLib   X 
License of the iMatix Standard Function Library   X 
W3C Software Notice and License   X 
Berkeley Database License (aka the Sleepycat 
Software Product License) 
  X 
OpenLDAP License, Version 2.7   X 
License of Python 1.6a2 and earlier versions   X 
License of Python 2.0.1, 2.1.1, and newer versions   X 
License of Perl   X 
Clarified Artistic License   X 
Zope Public License version 2.0   X 
Intel Open Source License (as published by OSI)   X 
License of Netscape Javascript  X  
eCos license version 2.0  X  
Eiffel Forum License, version 2   X 
License of Vim, Version 6.1 or later  X  
Boost Software License   X 
EU DataGrid Software License   X 
The license of Ruby   X 
XFree86 1.1 License   X 
Affero General Public License X   
The Condor Public License   X 
Original BSD license   X 
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OpenSSL license X   
Academic Free License, version 1.1.   X 
Open Software License, version 1.0  X  
Apache License, Version 1.0   X 
Apache License, Version 1.1   X 
Apache Software License, version 2.0   X 
Zope Public License version 1   X 
License of xinetd X   
License of Python 1.6b1 and later versions, 
through 2.0 and 2.1 
  X 
Old OpenLDAP License, Version 2.3   X 
IBM Public License, Version 1.0   X 
Common Public License Version 1.0   X 
Eclipse Public License Version 1.0   X 
Phorum License, Version 2.0   X 
LaTeX Project Public License   X 
Mozilla Public License (MPL)  X X 
Common Development and Distribution License 
(CDDL) 
 X  
Netizen Open Source License (NOSL), Version 1.0  X  
Interbase Public License, Version 1.0  X  
Sun Public License  X  
Nokia Open Source License  X  
Netscape Public License (NPL)  X  
Jabber Open Source License, Version 1.0   X 
Sun Industry Standards Source License 1.0  X  
Q Public License (QPL), Version 1.0   X 
PHP License, Version 3.0   X 
Zend License, Version 2.0   X 
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Vita Nuova Liberal Source License X   
Lucent Public License Version 1.02 (Plan 9 
license) 
  X 
Apple Public Source License (APSL), version 2   X 
GNU Free Documentation License X   
FreeBSD Documentation License   X 
Apple's Common Documentation License, Version 
1.0  
  X 
Open Publication License, Version 1.0  X  
Public Domain  X  
Artistic License 2.0    
BSD License   X 
GNAT Modified GPL (GMGPL)  X  
MIT/X Consortium License   X 
MITRE Collaborative Virtual Workspace License 
(CVW) 
X   
Open Software License X   
Ricoh Source Code Public Licence X   
The CeCILL License   X 
The Clarified Artistic License   X 
The Latex Project Public License (LPPL)   X 
The Open Content License X   
W3C License   X 
zlib/libpng License   X 
Zope Public License (ZPL)   X 
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